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AN OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL OF
GROWTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT*
A. John and R. Pecchenino
This article analyses the potential conflict bpiween econonnic growth and the maintenance of
environmental quality in an overlapping generations model. Shorl-livcd individuals make decisions
which have long-lasting effects on both factor productivity and the environment. The model
provides a theoretical explanation of observed correlations between environmental quality and
income, whereby ecotiomic growth is associated first with declines, then improvements, in
environmental quality. It suggests circumstances in which multiple Pareto-ranked steady-state
equilibria may arise, and in which sustained growth of both capital and environmental quality
may occur. Overmaititcnance of the environment, analogous to dynamically inefficient over-
accumulation of capital, may emerge.
The potential conflict between economic growth and environmental quality
was a prominent source of contention at the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (the 'Earth Summit') in Rio de Janeiro in
June 1992. Developed countries, now coming to terms with the environmentally
profligate policies of the past, are currently concerned about the long-run
effects of global environmental degradation, while developing countries,
concerned more with survival than greenery, seek faster growth.
The evidence on possible trade-offs between growth and environmental
quality invites careful analysis. Cross-sectional studies by the World Bank
suggest that some environmental problems, such as water pollution and
sanitation, are most severe at low income levels, while others, such as emission
of greenhouse gases, are worst in high income countries (see World Bank
(1992), p. 11). Perhaps most interestingly, air pollution (sulphur dioxide,
suspended particulate matter, and other pollutants) seems to be worst in
middle income countries (see Grossman and Krueger (1991), Selden and Song
(1993), World Bank (1992)). We offer a time-series explanation of these cross-
sectional findings in a dynamic general equilibrium model. The paper shows
how such results can arise when short-lived individuals make decisions
concerning the accumulation of capital and the provision of a public good,
environmental quality, where these decisions have long-lasting effects.
Environmental issues have been analysed extensively in the environmental
and natural resource literatures (see, for example, Baumol and Oates (1988)
and Dasgupta and Heal (1979)), but by assuming that the life span of
individuals and the life span of the economy are the same (possibly infinite),
researchers in environmental economics have for the most part restricted
themselves formally to the analysis of intragenerational problems. Further,
although intergenerational issues have been extensively discussed in the
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exhaustible resource literature (see, for example, Solow (1974, 1986)), they are,
for the most part, absent in models of pollution.^ Concern v '^ith economic
growth, meanwhile, is resurgent, as is evidenced by the work of Romer (1986),
Lucas (1988), Stokey (1988) and many others. Much of this work emphasises
the role of external increasing returns: investment in capital by one agent
improves the productive efficiency of all. This 'new growth theory' relies on
positive externalities to generate growth, but does not consider how negative
externalities from growth might in turn affect the growth process.
The model developed here utilises the overlapping-generations framework of
Allais (1947), Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). Such a demographic
structure permits analysis of situations where agents' actions have consequences
that outlive them.^ Agents live two periods, working while young and
consuming while old. The young allocate their wages between investment in
capital and investment in the environment, a public good. Agents get utility
from consumption and environmental quality. Their consumption degrades
the environment bequeathed to future generations, but their investment in
environmental quality improves the environment bequeathed to future
generations. Investment in capital improves the technology available to future
generations since the technology exhibits external increasing returns.
Section I of the paper sets out the model and defines equilibrium. Section II
characterises interior equilibrium without external increasing returns; Section
III considers the corner solution where agents do not engage in maintenance;
and Section IV considers equilibrium with external increasing returns. Welfare
analysis is contained in Section V. Section VI concludes.
I. THE ENVIRONMENT
Consider an infinite-hoHzon economy comprised of finitely-lived individuals
and perfectly competitive firms. A new generation (called generation t) is born
at each date t = 1,2,..., and lives for two periods. Assume no population growth
and normalise the size of each generation to unity.^ Agents born at date / have
preferences defined over consumption in old age, Cj+j, and an index of the
quality of the environment when they consume, -£",+1.^  These preferences are
^ John etal. (1994) consider appropriate tax policies in a model similar to the one utilised in this paper,
while John and Pecchenino (1993) analyse both international and intragenerational environmental
externalities. Howarth and Norgaard (1990) use a three-period model to consider the impart of property
rights on intergenerational equity, while Maler (1993) considers whether or not the decentralised
equilibrium in an overlapping generations economy is optimal when agents have well-defined property rights
over nonreproducible environmental resources.
' The overlapping generations framework is not unknown in the literature on public goods. Kemp and
Long (1980) and Mourmouras (1991) use it to analyse natural resource use, Maier (1993) for the pricing of
natural resources, and Sandier (1982) for the optimal provision and maintenance of club goods, such as
national parks, in a finite horizon economy.
' We consider population growth in a similar model in John et al. (1994).
* A simplifying assumption of our model is that agents do not consume in youth (and do not derive utility
from the environment in youth). We adopt this specification for three reasons. First, we wish to focus
attention on the choice between investment in the environment and investment in physical capital. The
consumption-saving choice is thus secondary to our main concerns. Second, in keeping with most
overlapping generations analyses, we wished to keep the model simple by allowing agents to optimise on one
margin only. Finally, much of the paper is directed at demonstrating possible outcomes and, in particular,
showing that the patterns observed in the data can arise even in a simple and stylised model.
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represented by the utility function U{Cf+^,Ef+^). Assume that U{') is twice
continuously differentiate and that f/i(')> ^2(') '*oj ^ n { ' ) ' ^22(") "^  Oi
and Ui^i') ^ o. Assume also that hm^^^ U-^ic^E) = 00.^
Young agents are each endowed with one unit of labour which they supply
to firms inelastically. They divide their wage, Wf, between saving, .r^ , for
consumption when old, and investment in environmental maintenance and
improvement, m,. When old, agents supply their saving inelastically to firms
and earn the gross return (i +/•(+!).
Environmental quality is a public good that evolves according to*
In the absence of human activity, the quality of the environment has an
autonomous level of zero; the parameter i6 [o , i] measures the speed of
reversion of environmental quality to this level. The term ^c^ is the degradation
of the environment as a result of the consumption of the old at /, while ym^
measures environmental improvement as a result of actions of the young at /.'
Possible interpretations of A"( include: the quality of soil or groundwater; the
cleanliness of rivers and oceans; some index of biodiversity; or the inverse of the
atmospheric concentration of chlorofluorocarbons, greenhouse gases, or other
pollutants. More broadly, E, could correspond to national parks, which have
amenity value and which also require maintenance.^
The firms are perfectly competitive profit maximisers who produce output
using the production function Y, = }l/-[Kf_.y) F{K^, Nf). Assume E{ ) exhibits con-
stant returns to scale, so output per worker can be written as t/f = ^(A'(_i)/(A,),
where k^ is the capital-labour ratio. Assume/(o) = 0 , _/'(•) > o , / " ( • ) ^ o,
and kf"{-) + / ' (" ) > o. The function ^(A^,_i) is a technological externality that
captures enhancements to productivity from last period's capital (^'(•) ^ o).
Because Kt_^ is predetermined at time /, if[K^_^) is a constant from the
perspective of current producers. Thus although the model exhibits increasing
returns from an intertemporal social perspective, production at any time period
^ We exclude intergenerational altruism, although we do consider the decisions of a long-lived social
planner in Section V.
* Note that E is therefore simply an index of the amenity value of environmental quality that can take on
positive or negative values. In particular, no special significance attaches to U{/,o). In a more specific
setting, we might wish to associate E with some particular biophysical index, in which case we would place
appropriate restrictions on preferences and technologies.
' Our mode! differs from Maler (\ 993) in that we assume that environmental quality is a public good that
is affected by consumption externalities and that enters the utility function, while he assumes that property
rights can be assigned over environmental resources that enter the production function. In Maler's model,
the existence of property rights allows environmental resources to he efficiently priced even though agents
are short-lived. In our model, the absence of property rights implies that environmental quality may not be
dynamically efficient even though agents value the environment and contribute to its maintenance. See
Section V below.
* For some environmental problems, such as ozone layer depletion or biodiversity loss, direct amelioration
of the environment is difficult or impossible. We could however interpret m, as pollution abatement, and
think of the equation in the text as a linear approximation of a more complicated relationship among
consumption, abatement, and the quality of the environment. Evidently, also, some environmental problems
are longer-lived than others. Note, though, that even short-lived environmental externalities can have long-
lived consequences. For example, if acid rain damages an ancient monument, its effects remain after the
pollution problem is solved. Similarly, ocean or river pollution could have effects on fish stocks that persist
long after the resource is cleaned up.
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is a constant-returns activity.^ Since the population is normalised to one,
) can be written as ^(^(-i)- The capital stock depreciates at rate
[
Because our focus is on external effects across generations, we wish to
abstract from the well-understood free-rider problems within a generation. We
therefore assume that those alive at date I are represented by a one-period lived
government whose sole responsibility is the provision of the public good,
environmental quality, for the benefit of agents alive during its period of office.
Specifically, it levies lump-sum taxes on the young to achieve their jointly
desired level of environmental maintenance, while leaving the welfare of the
old unchanged. Equivalently, we can think ofa social planner's setting prices
for the public good such that agents will fund it at the socially optimal level
for that generation. This is, essentially, the pricing mechanism underlying a
Lindahl equilibrium.
Agents take as given the wage, UJ(, the return on saving, rj^j, and
environmental quality at the beginning of period t, E^}^ The lifetime choice
problem ofa representative agent is to choose Cf_^.i, m, and s^ to maximise
(0
subject to
(2)
(3)
(4)
The individual firm takes the wage and the rental rate on capital as given. It
hires labour until the marginal product of labour equals the wage, and hires
capital until the net marginal product of capital equals the rental rate.'^
A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence {A,, i:,,iy(,r(, m(,.r,,
f ,}^, such that, at each date t = 1,2,...,
(i) agents maximise (i) subject to (2)-(4);
(ii) firms maximise profits;
(iii) markets clear;
and {k-^^Ey} are given.
' The inclusion of last period's capital stock in the current production technology is motivated by the
recent literature on external increasing returns in growth models; see, for example, Romer (1986) and Wei!
(1989). Romer's insight, drawing on Arrow's (196a) analysis of leaming-by-doing and Young's (1928)
analysis of increasing returns, is that production generates knowledge as a by-product.
'" In this problem, we make the competitive assumption that the return on saving is taken as given.
Alternatively, we could analyse a planner's problem in which the planner takes account of the fact that the
allocation of output to maintenance or saving affects the return to saving. The only difference between the
two approaches is that the latter includes an extra term in the return to saving in the first-order condition,
(7); the main conclusions of the paper are unaffected. We choose our formulation for a number of reasons.
First, we wish to stay as close as possible to the Diamond (1965) model. Second, the planning approach
complicates matters by effectively introducing an extra distortion, since young agents no longer act as price-
takers. Third, we analyse the effect of that distortion elsewhere; see John etal. (1994).
*^ We also assume that there is an initial generation of old agents who are endowed with the capital
stock in the first period [k^). These old agents supply their capital to firms and consume the proceeds
(fj = (i +''i)Aj). The firms in the first period arc endowed with the technology ^{kf^)f(k.^), where ^(k^) is
given.
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II. INTERIOR EQUILIBRIUM WITHOUT EXTERNAL INCREASING
RETURNS
We first analyse equilibrium in the absence of external increasing returns. That
is, we set ^ {k) = i, all k. Along a dynamic equilibrium path, equations (2)-(4)
and the following equations ((5)-(8)) are satisfied for all /:
r,=r{k,)-S = r{k,) (5)
{k,) (6)
. ^ (+i ) = 0 (7)
*m = ^r (8)
Equations (5) and (6) are the standard first-order conditions from the firm's
maximisation problem in period t. Equation (7) is the first-order condition
from the agent's maximisation problem: the individual chooses .s, to equate the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and environmental quality
to the marginal rate of transformation/^ This presumes an interior solution,
although nothing in the model precludes the possibility that agents choose not
to engage in maintenance; we consider this possiblity in the next section.
Equation (8) is the goods market clearing condition: the capital stock at / is
fully determined by saving decisions made at /— i.
The dynamic behaviour of the system can be determined as follows. Leading
(5) one period and substituting out for s^, r,+j, w^ and m, yields
i) = <f^t+i) (9)
E,,, = {i-b) E,-^c,-\~y{[i-u{k,)]f{k,)-k,,,}; (11)
where v{k) = kf'{k)/f{k) is capital's share of output. Now use (9) and (9)
lagged one period to rewrite (10) and (11) as
(.3)
where p{kt) = {7[i — i^ (A:,)] —/?i'(ij}. Since (12) implicitly defines .Ej+j as a
function of A(+j only, rewrite it as
£(^ .1 = (pik,^i)- (14)
It is easy to confirm that 0'( ) > o: agents choose their mix of saving and
maintenance such that a higher capital stock is associated with higher
environmental quality.^^ Finally, substitute (14) and (14) lagged once into (13)
to obtain the following first-order nonhnear difference equation in k:
o. (13)
'^ The Samuelson condition for the optimal provision of a public good (the marginal rate of
transformation equals the sum of agents' marginal rates of substitution) is trivially satisfied in equation {7),
since the number of agents has been normalised to one. The condition is only satisfied for a single generation,
however; the dynamic analog of this condition appears in Section IV below.
'^ Specifically, ^'( ) = - [^ i i '^ ' ( i+ ' )+ ' ^ i ' ' ' - y^ ' uc ' ] / [6 ' , a ( i+ r ) -y t ' ^ j ] . The assumption that
f"{k)k+f'{k) > o is sufficient (not necessary) for c'( ) > o, which, together with our assumption that
U^^i ) 5 0, is sufficient (not necessary) for 0'( ) > o.
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Fig. [. Interior equilibrium without external increasing returns (a) (p < o), (i) {p > o).
Using (15), we can determine the dynamic behaviour of the capital stock, and
hence all other endogenous variables, along an equilibrium path. '^*
We illustrate the economy in E—k space by considering (13) and (14)
separately. Let k and E denote steady state values. The law of motion for the
environment (13), in steady state, can be rewritten as^ ^
[SSE] (i6)
The first-order condition (14) is, in steady state,
[FOC] in)
These equations are illustrated in Figs, i a and i b. Fig. i a shows the case where
p{k) < oVA;; Fig. lb shows the case where p{k) > oVA;.^ * The economy is in
steady state where ^{k) =<p(k), that is, where the two functions intersect. A
^* The proviso that (15) holds only along an equilibrium path is important. In particular, note that we
used the first-order conditions for both i— i and (in deriving (15). IneflFect, (15) uses the period (equiUbrium
conditions to obtain i,+j, given A, and given that the economy was at an interior equilibrium in period (—1.
'* We assume in this and the following discussion that b > o. Analysis of the case where i = o is
straightforward. The term p{k)f(k) is the change in environmental quality that would result if,
counterfactually, young agents devoted their entire wage to maintenance: in this case, labour's share of
output, [1 —!'( )l/( ), would go toward maintenance and capital's share, v{ )f\ ) , would to to consumption.
The other two terms reflect the fact that agents do not devote their entire wage to maintenance: each unit
of saving by young agents implies both (i — 51 extra units of consumption and one less unit of maintenance:
net environmental improvement each period thus equals p{k)f(k} — [fi{ i —S)+y]k, which must equal the
natural decline of environmental quality {bE) in steady-state equilibrium.
'* [f the technology is Cobb-Douglas, then vik) and hence p{k) are constant. In this case. Figs i a and 1 b
illustrate the only possible forms oi'(p(k). For other technologies, p{k) may change sign as A: varies, and fp{k)
need not be so well hehaved.
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Steady-State is stable if the FOC line cuts the SSE line from below. We can
confirm this by linearising (15) around steady state to obtain
The coefficient in (18) is less than one if and only \ifp'{k) < <l>'[k).
There is no (non-autarkic) steady state if the FOC line lies everywhere above
the SSE line, and there are two steady-state equilibria if the two curves
intersect twice. In this case the equilibrium with higher capital and
environmental quality is stable.^' Multiple equilibria are consistent with
observations of relatively poor economies with serious problems of coincident
environmental degradation and economic decline; many countries in Eastern
Europe currently fit this description. Contrary to the popular perception that
pollution stems from high GDP, it may rather be the case that only rich
countries can spare the resources to combat environmental problems.^^ Such a
view was expressed by delegates from developing nations at the Earth Summit.
The dynamic adjustment of the economy is also illustrated in Figs, i a and i b.
Because £( = <l>{kf) in all time periods, the economy adjusts along the FOC.
When the equilibrium path of the economy lies below the SSE line, the
economy is growing, environmental quality is improving, and the welfare of
successive generations is increasing through time.
III. ZERO-MAINTENANCE EQ_UILIBRIUM
Agents in economies with little capital or with high environmental quality may
choose not to engage in maintenance of the environment. Maintaining our
assumption of no external increasing returns, equilibrium in this case is
described by a similar set of equations to before, except that the first-order
condition (7) is replaced by the zero-maintenance condition:
m, = 0. (19)
Under zero maintenance, workers save all their wage income, so the evolution
of the economy is described by
(20)
E,,,= {i-b)E,-/3c{k,). (21)
Zero maintenance is a corner solution to the agent's maximisation problem.
Since agents' saving is limited by their wage income, k,^^ cannot exceed w^.
Agents who, if unconstrained, would like to save in excess of their wage are at
the corner and carry out no maintenance. We define the zero maintenance
*^  As noted in footnote 12, the SSE might be less well-behaved than those illustrated in Fig. i, in which
case more than two equilibria are possible.
'* The intuition behind the multiplicity is as follows. At a low-A, low-£ equiUhrium, agents have relatively
more of an incentive to engage in environmental maintenance. Since agents are putting resources into
maintenance, they do not save much and the capital stock is low; this implies that agents have low income
and so cannot engage in much maintenance, validating the poor environmental quality. By contrast, at a
high-A, high-i? equilibrium, agents have a greater incentive to save, leading to a higher capital stock and a
greater ability to engage in maintenance. Environmental quality is then high, despite the adverse effects of
high consumption.
© Royal Economic Society 1994
ie-2
1400 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [NOVEMBER
manifold (ZMM) as the set of points where agents are just indifferent between
2ero and positive maintenance: that is, {.£(,A;J such that equations (2)-(8) and
(22)
(23)
Equilibrium is illustrated in Fig. 2, which reproduces the steady-state first-
order condition (FOC) and the steady-state environment condition (SSE) from
Fig. 16, and also shows the zero-maintenance manifold (ZMM).^" In the
region above the manifold, environmental quality is sufficiently good and/or
there is sufficiently little capital that agents choose not to engage in
maintenance. Fig. 2 also shows the loci of points such that the capital stock is
A zero-maintenance steady-state is defined by
and, as before, E = (p{k), so that
I
Fig. 2, Dynamic adjustment to zero-maintenance steady state.
unchanging (given by i = ^^ and such that environmental quality is
unchanging (given by £ = — (y?/i) cik)). Above the ZMM line, the adjustment
to steady state is indicated by the arrows in the usual way; below the ZMM line
the economy is governed by the dynamics derived in the previous section.^^
" The general equation of the ZMM is
l},{c\x'>[k,)\, (I -b) E,-fic(k,)){i +r[w{k,n-S)-yU^{c[w{k,)l (i -b) E,-fic(k,)} = o.
It is easy to show that the ZMM slopes upward in E—k space.
*" If we set k = k^ and find the values of E implied by each relationship, we can show that
^(K) = ('^*)^imm + *9'(*i)' It follows that the FOC must lie between the SSE and the ZMM at k^, as
illustrated. Note also that the picture is substantively identical for the case where p(k) < o, VA.
" For simplicity, we have analysed the dynamics separately under zero maintenance and at an interior
solution. An economy might however move in and out of zero maintenance. To track the behaviour of our
model completely, one should check at each date whether the economy lies above or below the ZMM, and
then apply the appropriate set of difference equations.
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Fig. 3. Initial decline and subsequent improvement in environmental quality.
Now consider an economy that initially possesses little capital and has
environmental quality in the neighbourhood of E = o. The dynamic
adjustment of the economy entails increases in k and decrease in E. As agents
accumulate capital, the consumption externality causes degradation of the
environment; successive generations, being at the zero-maintenance corner, do
not find maintenance worthwhile. The dynamics of the economy therefore
imply a negative correlation between environmental quality and growth under
zero maintenance, in contrast to the positive correlation at interior equi-
librium.^^ Moreover, a growing economy that moves from zero to positive
maintenance will exhibit environmental quality that deteriorates initially and
later improves. Such adjustment is illustrated in Fig. 3. As noted previously,
similar patterns have been observed in cross-sectional data.
The analysis also sheds light on why some environmental problems exhibit
improvement at low income levels while others worsen even in rich countries.
For problems such as poor water quality, it is likely that the returns to
maintenance are high and that agents would be willing to give up large
amounts of consumption in return for improvements in environmental quality.
In this case, the ZMM will lie close to the E axis, implying that economies
would move into positive maintenance at relatively low values of k.^^ For, say,
carbon dioxide build-up, by contrast, the returns to maintenance may be low
and agents may value environmental quality relatively less. In this case, the
" As is evident from Fig, 2, it is possible for a growing economy to exhibit improving environmental
quality under zero maintenance only if the economy initially suffers from a degraded environment, so that
the natural reversion of the environment to its autonomous level outweighs the consumption externality.
*^  It is easy to verify that increases in y shift the ZMM inward. The second assertion is easily proved
graphically by representing preferences by indifference curves in E—k space and considering a global change
in the marginal rate of substitution.
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ZMM will lie further to the right, implying that even relatively rich economies
might continue with zero maintenance. Of course, such results are only
suggestive and should more properly be analysed in a model that explicitly
includes a number of different environmental concerns.
If the dynamic path ofthe economy lies under the SSE locus, the utility of
successive generations is still increasing along a zero-maintenance growth path,
even though environmental quality is deteriorating.'*'* If the path lies above the
SSE locus, welfare could be improving or declining, depending on initial
conditions. The model can thus generate the phenomenon of economic growth
that is more than offset by declining environmental quality: higher income
does not automatically translate into higher welfare in the model.^^
IV. EQUILIBRIUM WITH EXTERNAL INCREASING RETURNS
Economic growth is usually defined in terms of increased output of goods and
services. Environmentalists and others have challenged this definition, noting
that increased output won at the expense of a degraded environment need not
imply improved social welfare. As just noted, our model can deliver dynamic
paths along which the economy is growing but the welfare of successive
generations is falling. In this section we modify our model to allow for sustained
output growth, and examine the robustness of our previous results.
When current productivity is affected by the last period's capital stock, the
interest rate, the wage and the level of consumption are functions of current
and lagged capital. That is, equations (5), (6) and (3) are replaced by
(24)
.) (25)
^^(+1 = (i+''i+i)^m = f(^(+i'^ ()- (26)
Interior equilibrium is described by these equations and equations (2), (4), (7)
and (8) as before. We can describe equilibrium in this case by^*
{27)
rf^t.v (28)
Along an equilibrium path, the dynamics are described by the following
second-order difference equation, which is a natural extension of (18).
<f>{k,,,,k,) + yk,,,-{i~b)^{k,,k,_,)+^{i-S)k,-p{k,)ir{k,,,)f{k,)=o. (29)
" To derive the welfare result we need simply note that, if agents inherit an {£,,A,} pair below the SSE,
then they can choose E^^^ > £, and ,^^ .1 > k,. In effect, their budget set contains the point thai they inherit.
'* To confirm that declining welfare is possible, consider an economy that initially has E = o and k = k^.
The dynamic adjustment ofthe economy would entail declining environmental quality and no changes in
the capital stock. Welfare would thus be decreasing through time. It is easy to construct less extreme
examples.
" Note that capital's share is independent of A,_,, heing given by
hence the definition oip{k) is unchanged.
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Steady state is defined by
(30)
(30
We know that <Pi{) > o and, under weak restrictions, ^^l ) > o also, so
is increasing in k.^'^ Equation {31) is a simple extension of (17). If the external
increasing returns are not too strong, then the qualitative behaviour of the
model is little changed, but with strong increasing returns, sustained growth is
possible. To show this, we characterise the behaviour of<p as ^^-co.
LEMMA I . In what follows., all limits refer to k-^cc. Let \im [f{k) ^ [k] / k] = A,
possibly infinite. Let \iv[iv{k) = v. If \\mp{k) = y{i—v)—pv > o and A>
, then \iif\^{k) — 00; otherwise \\m^{k) = — co.
Proof.
= {^^ (limA) {\imp[k) f{k)f{k)/k- [fi{i -
Under the inequalities stated, the term in parentheses is positive; otherwise
it is negative. We can note as a corollary that \m\f'[k) = 0 is necessary for
lim^{ ) = 00, because lim/'[k] ^ o=>v = \. •
If ^{k)f{k) is strictly concave in A, then the qualitative behaviour of the
model is substantively identical to Figs, i a and i b. The only difference is
that $!( ) is a function of two arguments and can now only be used to bound
£(+1, given values of A:^  and kf^^\ if A(+i > A(, then 0(A,+i,A:,.n) > £(+j > ^{kf^ki).
If the external increasing returns are sufficiently strong, however, so that
\^{k)f{k) is convex, then the model is as illustrated in Figs. 412 and 46.^*
Sustained growth is then possible.^^
" A sufficient {not necessary) condition for 02( ) > o is [i + r + UyycfU.^\ > o.
** Again, we have drawn the Figures for p(k) < oVA and p{k) > oVA:; more complicated pictures are
possible if p( ) changes sign.
" For sustained growth to occur, we also need lim [^,( ) +0j( )] > \im<p'{k). We cannot say much about
this condition in general, bu( it is easy to construct examples where it is satisfied. Our intention in this paper
is not to present a mode! of growth per se, but to examine how capital accumulation and accumulation of
environmental quality interact. We have therefore chosen a simple means of generating sustained growth in
our model, but we emphasise that the main conclusions of this paper do not rest on an assumption of global
increasing returns.
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Fig. 4. Interior equilibrium with external increasing returns (a) (p < o), [b] [p > o).
The model can exhibit a low-level equilibrium trap, as also illustrated in
Fig. 46: economies with sufficient capital and environmental quality can take
advantage of the increasing returns and experience sustained growth, while
economies with worse initial conditions will move either towards shutdown or
a low-level stable equilibrium. A distinctive feature ofthe model is that we can
obtain a stable, non-autarkic, low-level equilibrium, even if the production
function exhibits increasing returns throughout. This contrasts, for example,
with Azariadis and Drazen (1990), who generate a low-level equilibrium from
a discontinuity in the production function, and with Jones and Manuelli
(1992), who do not have a stable non-autarkic equilibrium under external
increasing returns. In common with those models, however, we confirm that
external increasing returns play an important role in the growth process. Jones
and Manuelli show that concave production functions preclude growth in a
one-sector overlapping generations model because the ratio of wages to the
capital stock falls as the capital stock increases, so the young cannot continually
purchase larger and larger stocks of capital. In our notation, A > 1/(1 —0) is
therefore necessary for growth, but we require a stronger restriction because, in
our setting, richer economies must also devote more income to environmental
improvement.^"
Finally, we note that the main result ofthe previous section also holds under
external increasing returns. A growing economy may initially exhibit declining
environmental quality because agents choose not to maintain it. It is straight-
forward to show that an economy on a sustained growth path will not engage
indefinitely in zero maintenance. Hence economies that achieve a sustained
growth path in the model will ultimately be characterised by improving
environmental quality. This possibility is illustrated in Fig. 5.
^^  The possibility of a low-level equilibrium in this model also bears on the current debate over whether
or not economies converge over time. For example, Durlauf and Johnson (1992) argue that the
Summers and Heston (1991) international data set supports the idea that there is local but not global
convergence; that is, countries with .similar initial conditions converge to the same equilibrium, but countries
with different initial conditions do not.
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Fig. 5. Initial decline and subsequent improvement in environmental quality.
V. WELFARE ANALYSIS
Since environmental damage may outlive its perpetrators, overlapping
generations models provide an appropriate demographic structure for analysis
of environmental externalities. The structure complicates the analysis of
Pare to-improving policies, since the welfare of multiple generations must be
considered. Moreover, intergenerational externalities are intrinsically hard to
internalise; those imposing the externalities are not alive at the same time as
those who enjoy or suffer the consequences.
We first find the golden-rule allocation by analysing the problem of a social
planner who treats all generations symmetrically. The planner solves
Maximise U{c,E)
subject to
(32)
(33)
bE=ym~^c, {34)
where {32) and (33) represent economic feasibility and (34) is the steady-state
environment equation. Eliminate m and solve for c to obtain
_ (35)
Equation (35) expresses consumption as a function of k and E in any steady
state. Substituting into the objective function, we obtain
maximise V
B.k
,E .
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The first-order conditions are
[NOVEMBER
(36)
(37)
From (36), the planner sets capital at the level at which net output is
maximised: ^f + '^'f— -^^ ^ This is essentially the familiar condition for the
golden-rule level of capital; in the absence of external increasing returns
it reduces to / ' = S. From (37), the planner equates the marginal rate
of substitution of consumption for maintenance to the marginal rate of
transformation. The solution decomposes in this way because the planner can
translate any increase in output into increased consumption and maintenance
such that environmental quality is constant, unambiguously increasing utility.
The planner thus maximises output, and then divides it optimally.
Note that (37) is a dynamic analog of the Samuelson condition for the
optimal provision of a public good, where marginal rates of substitution are in
this case summed across generations, rather than individuals. Environmental
quahty is a public good that depreciates at rate i, so a one-unit improvement
in environmental quahty for one generation implies improvements of (i — A),
[i —b)^, (i —i)^, and so on, for subsequent generations. This infinite sum gives
rise to the '6 ' in the right-hand-sidedenominator of (37). Comparing (37) with
(7) establishes that the planner internalises the consumption externality (the
^/b term) and the maintenance externality (the x/b in the y/b term). We can
interpret equation (37) as defining the optimal E for given k. It is easily shown
that it attains a maximum at the golden rule capital stock, as shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. The golden rule allocation.
As is well-known, the competitive equilibrium ofan overlapping generations
model can be dynamically inefficient, in which case all generations would
benefit if they accumulated less capital and increased their consumption. Not
" Note that if there are sufficiently strong external increasing returns net output might be unbounded.
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surprisingly, such a result carries over to this model whenever k exceeds its
golden rule level (regions II and IV). There is an analogous possibility of
inefficiency in terms of environmental quahty (regions I and II) : agents may
overmaintain, implying that all generations could be made better off by
maintaining less and consuming more.^ '^  In region III, simple Pareto-
improving policies are not so easily found, but Pareto improvements can still
be implemented by a planner who reallocates resources between generations.
These results are formalised in Propositions i and 2.
by
PROPOSITION I. Consider an economy in steady state, (i) If{i/rf' — S) < -^ 1, there
is overmaintenance of the environment, (ii) Overmaintenance is impossible if the economy
is dynamically efficient and there are no external increasing returns {i/f{k) = i, VA).
Proof, (i) Overmaintenance ofthe environment occurs if, at a given steady-state
k, equilibrium environmental quality is higher than that chosen by the social
planner. Suppose not: fix k and let E' < E^, where /denotes the individual
and P the planner. From equation (35), ^ > (^. Now
since U^^{ ) ^ o. From equations (7) and (37)
But combining these results with the previous inequalities contradicts the
inequality stated in the proposition. Therefore E^ > E', as was to be shown.
(ii) Since i/f = i and ^ ' ( ) = 0, dynamic efficiency implies^"' —(J ^  o. The result
follows from (i) since by/{^+y) < i. •
PROPOSITION 2. Pareto-improving policies are generically possible in any equilibrium with
positive maintenance or with no external increasing returns.
Proof. For the sake of economy of notation, we suppose that the economy is
initially in steady-state equilibrium {^ , £, m, c)., although the method of proof is
applicable to any equilibrium. Consider the following perturbation. At time T,
change maintenance by a small amount A (not necessarily positive) and let
saving be changed by —A. Thus, m^  = m-)-A; k.^^^ = k — ^. At time T-I-2,
change maintenance by —a: m^+g ~ fn — cc. Feasibility in period t implies
By feasibility, c^ is unchanged, and so the utihty of all generations born up to
*^ If the economy is in region I, II or iV, Pareto-improving policies entail transfers from the young to the
old. Such Pareto improvements could be supported by social contracts ofthe type discussed by Kotlikoff e(
al. (1988).
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and including T— i is unchanged. To a first-order approximation, the utility of
members of generation T is also unchanged (by the envelope theorem). By
calculating c^ j^ ^"*i ^T+2) taking a Taylor series expansion of the utility of
generation T-\- I and using the first-order condition, we obtain the following
expression for the change in utility of that generation:
Now choose a such that this expression equals zero, so that, by construction,
utility of all generations up to and including T-\-I is now unchanged.
Consumption of all generations including and after T-I-2 is also unchanged by
construction. It remains to consider environmental quahty at T-I-3:
If the expression in parentheses is positive, then A > o (increased maintenance
and reduced consumption) is Pareto-improving. Conversely, if this expression
is negative, then A < o is Pareto-improving. Setting A < o is not possible in a
zero-maintenance equilibrium. The first three terms in this expression are
positive, because increased maintenance and reduced consumption improve
environmental quality. The last term captures the externality from capital
investment: lower saving at time T implies lower output at time T + 2. TO
complete the proof, note that the effect on E^^.^ is first-order, so we can
compensate generations T and T-I- i for their second-order losses (by increasing
consumption and decreasing maintenance by small amounts in periods T+ 1
and T + 2), while still ensuring that environmental quality remains higher at
T + 3- •
Pareto-improvements are generically possible because there are two
conflicting externalities associated with the saving/maintenance decision.
Increased saving benefits future generations through the external increasing
returns, and hurts future generations through reduced maintenance and
greater consumption; higher saving is desirable if the first effect dominates.^^
VI. CONCLUSION
The relationship between growth and the quality of the environment is
complex. Some elements of environmental quality appear to improve with
growth; others worsen; still others exhibit deterioration followed by amelior-
ation. We offer an explanation of these findings in a simple dynamic model
in which agents accumulate both capital and environmental quality. Multiple
Pareto-ranked steady-state equilibria can arise as a result of the interaction
between capital accumulation and environmental quality. Short-lived agents
may overinvest in environmental quality in a manner analogous to dynamically
*^ As noted in the proof, increased saving is not possible in a zero-maintenance equilibrium. We do not
emphasise this result since it is almost certainly not robust to a change in the model whereby agents consume
in both periods of life.
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inefficient capital accumulation. Even when the economy is dynamically
efficient in terms of capital and the environment, Pareto improvement can be
implemented by a long-lived planner.
Our model is stylised and could be extended in many ways. In general,
environmental externalities could arise from production or consumption and
could affect welfare or productivity. We focus here only on externalities from
consumption to utility, but other linkages are worthy of further study. We
assumed exogenous pollution and maintenance functions, so agents could not
invest in cleaner production technologies or better maintenance technologies.
The patterns of pollution and growth observed in the data also suggest that
a model with more than one type of environmental externality may be
informative. And, while we have identified possible Pareto-improvements, we
have said little about either the efficacy or the implementation of different
policies. All of these are topics for future research. Finally, we emphasise again
that the distinguishing feature of our model is the existence of a long-lived
public good. While we have discussed our model in terms of environmental
quality, the analysis has more general applicability.
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